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INSURANCE LAW – POLICY INTERPRETATION 
 
Summary 
 
 An appeal from a District Court’s denial of summary judgment. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 District Court’s decision affirmed because the insurance contract’s liability exhaustion 
provision was ambiguous. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Sparks test-drove a vehicle owned by a Las Vegas car dealership. During the test, Sparks 
was involved in an accident. The injured party sued Sparks and the dealership for negligence. 
Sparks insurer, Benchmark, deposited Sparks’ entire policy limit with the district court 
($30,000), and then subsequently filed for summary judgment citing the insurance contract’s 
following provision as their grounds: 
 
We will pay damages for “bodily injury” or “property damages” 
for which any “insured” becomes legally responsible because of an 
auto accident…. We will settle or defend, as we consider 
appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition 
to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our 
duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this 
coverage has been exhausted. 
  
 This district court denied Benchmark’s motion for summary judgment, wherein 
Benchmark filed an appeal shortly thereafter.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The present case asked the court whether an insurer may contractually limits its duties. 
Writing for a majority of three, Justice Parraguirre began the opinion by first stating the general 
rule: an insurer may contractually limit their duties only if it does so unambiguously. The court 
then moved to the specific question in this case: whether Benchmark’s limitation of duty clause 
is unambiguous.  
 The court looked to the North Carolina Supreme Court, wherein Brown v. Lumberman 
Mutual Casualty Co. answered this same question while considering a nearly identical insurance 
clause.
2
 The Brown court held the clause must be read in whole, not in isolation; and 
accordingly, the “we will settle or defense … any claim or suit” sentence conflict with “our duty 
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 390 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 1990) 
to settle or defend ends when . . . ” Accordingly, this provision is ambiguous because it is 
“reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.”3 
 An ambiguous provision of an insurance policy “should be construed to effectuate the 
reasonable expectations of the insured.” National Union Fire Ins. v. Caesars Palace, 106 Nev. 
330, 332-33, 792 P.2d 1129, 1130 (1990). Consequently, the court concluded Spark reasonably 
expected Benchmark to provide a legal defense until it used his policy’s liability limits to obtain 
a settlement or satisfy a judgment. The court then ended its opinion by state Benchmark’s failure 
to obtain a settlement required them to continue providing Sparks with a legal defense. 
 
Conclusion 
 Although an insurer may contractually limit its duties, any potential ambiguity in their 
liability coverage is interpreted in favor of the insured. An ambiguity is present when the 
provision, when read in whole, can be interpreted as having more than one meaning. 
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